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Abstract
Throughout the 1990s the state of Yugoslavia dissolved, ravaged by horrendous
conflict. Since, several retributive and restorative mechanisms to cope with past
atrocities have been attempted. In these processes social activists and civil society
organizations have increasingly gained ground. Employing concepts of sociology of
spaces, which focuses on the creation of spaces through action and the
interdependence of action on spatial structures, I argue that activists move between
different spaces constituted by narratives of justice and truth. Different NGOs across
the region run trial monitoring and/or witness support programs—examples of activist
involvement in legal spatiality. Recent fact-finding and documenting projects, such as
the regional RECOM initiative, illustrate the creation and expansion of so-called truth
spaces by activists. In the constitution phase of these spaces, i.e. the consultation
meetings to establish the mandate for commissions or other investigative bodies,
stakeholders (i.e. activists, practitioners, representatives and experts) rely on tangible
and practicable legal instruments. A phenomenon I refer to as the legalization of truth
spaces. Despite the symbiotic relationship between human rights activists and judicial
practitioners this phenomenon illustrates the continuous political struggle of the
former to institutionalize alternative transitional justice mechanisms. While their work
focuses on personal narratives instead of grand narratives—creating a space for
multiple narratives of victimhood—such a strategy bears several challenges vis-à-vis
victims groups and broader reconciliatory processes.
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Introduction
In the 1990s the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia broke up, engulfed by
violence across the region. Amidst flaring conflict, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was created with the aim to push
for accountability for past war crimes and human rights violations. Over the
years, the ad hoc UN Tribunal’s work has led to a spillover effect of
international criminal law into domestic judicial systems in the region (Teitel
2010; Martin-Ortega and Herman 2010), and civil society actors have
supported these retributive justice efforts participating and/or running different
programs, including witness protection and trial monitoring.2 Recent research
on this topic affirmed that civil society actors, as a result, expanded their
influence and impact—reaching beyond the initial judicial support, in which
NGOs have been invited to participate by state actors—and created a
deliberative space to increase victims’ voices in society, so-called ‘invented
spaces’ (Jeffrey 2011). Such scholarly insight is important, as several past
restorative justice attempts across different countries in the region resulted in
limited success (Jouhanneau 2010; Grodsky 2009; Jelena Pejic 2001).
Notwithstanding, social activists and civil society organizations have
incrementally increased their role and reach in transitional justice processes.3
In this article, I discuss the ongoing 2008-transnational truth-seeking initiative,
called Coalition for RECOM, to elucidate the sociopolitical struggle of coalition
members to advocate for alternative models to cope with mass atrocity in the
former Yugoslavia.
Drawing on concepts of sociology of spaces—based on the study of
establishing spaces through action and the interdependence of action on
spatial structures (Urry 2000)—I illustrate how activists move between
different spaces constituted by narratives of justice and truth. The study is
based on over two dozen semi-structured interviews with key actors, such as
human rights activists, representatives of domestic and international judicial
institutions, and international organizations, among others.4 While early on,
human rights organizations in the region acted primarily within the legal
space—they contributed to improving domestic war crimes prosecutions by
providing support to witnesses and victims, some of who were initially
exposed to intimidation and death threats due to the absence of anonymous
testimonies in the court room during hearings and the lack of media
responsibility5—subsequent projects were (and still are) an attempt to expand
their space from domestic justice-oriented activities to regional truth-finding
efforts.
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Other authors and reports have criticized the effectiveness of this justice cascade. See for
instance (Subotić 2009) and annual activity reports of NGOs, such as Documenta and
Humanitarian Law Center, among others.
3
Several authors have addressed the question of human rights activism in transitional justice
processes and in particular highlighting the important impact of local NGOs in different regions
(Roht-Arriaza 2005; Collins 2006; Burt 2009).
4
Additionally, the study draws from various reports and other documentation.
5
See “Transitional Justice in the Balkans—Judicial Transparency and Media Responsibility,”
conference organized by the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN), Sarajevo, BiH,
September 1-3, 2009.
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Interestingly, however, the expansion of so-called truth spaces poses
myriad challenges. The attempt of establishing a truth-seeking body for the
former Yugoslavia has faced different types of opposition, ranging from
internal disapproval by certain of its members to external (in)direct critique
and politicization across the region. With the aim of creating a broad regional
truth-finding initiative, the Coalition for RECOM also grapples with different
types of victims (including families of victims, prisoners, and veterans, among
others) who have, sometimes, conflicting needs and/or demands. Moreover,
the dominance of legal concepts in institutionalizing truth-seeking measures
raises questions about the influence and consequences of hard justice (such
as retributive mechanisms) on soft justice (such as restorative tools, including
truth commissions). In this article, I refer to this trend as the legalization of
truth spaces. In fact, with the current legalization of truth spaces activists not
only increase their ‘invented’ space to foster deliberative spaces of justice for
civil society, but also attempt to embed their newly created space in the
space originally provided by state institutions to depoliticize transitional justice
efforts in the region. I argue, however, that their goal of legal-oriented
depoliticization of restorative justice processes remains nonetheless highly
political.
This article is organized in three sections. First, I describe the continuous
struggle of human rights activists to create a transnational extra-legal space
to deal with the past across the former Yugoslavia. I particularly focus on
internal and external obstacles the movement faces. Second, I discuss issues
of multiple narratives of victimhood, partly because of the transnational
character of the restorative justice efforts. In order to do so, I draw on several
different cases. Third, I examine the challenges of the legalistic influence on
truth seeking. In particular, I analyze the ongoing political battle to
institutionalize alternative transitional justice mechanisms.

The RECOM Initiative: Struggling Efforts to Create Extra-Judicial Space
Several authors have explored the sociopolitical role of NGOs in society using
a sociology-of-space perspective in order to illustrate their active involvement
in shaping policy processes (Miraftab and Wills 2005).6 Drawing on Miraftab’s
and Wills’ notion of invited spaces—i.e. state institutions provide opportunities
for civil society to participate actively in certain problem areas—Alex Jeffrey
recently analyzed the creation of space (invented spaces) by Bosnian human
rights organizations to allow for deliberate conceptions of justice that go
beyond legal institutions and processes (Jeffrey 2011). His study defies a
legalist approach, illustrating how activists who initially cooperated with the
judiciaries have established alternative ways to implement transitional justice
in post-conflict settings. While I employ these concepts to investigate regional
transitional justice NGO activities in the former Yugoslavia in this paper, I
concentrate on the difficulties human rights activists are confronted with
during the creation of regional restorative justice efforts.
The recent attempts of institutionalizing an interstate fact-finding body—
to account for past human rights violations and war crimes in the Balkans—
emerged as a response to the rising critique of international and domestic war
6
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crimes prosecutions in the region. In fact, retributive justice mechanisms to
cope with the past, such as ICTY, despite its great global impact on and
model character for human rights and criminal law, has only partially fulfilled
its mandate to help war-torn and post-conflict societies in the region transition
(Subotić 2009). Some of the issues include: the geographical distance of the
court in the Netherlands and the crime scene sites—which has often been
criticized by victims/witnesses; the trial of selective cases only (both on the
international as well as domestic level); and the politicization of cooperation
processes between countries of the former Yugoslavia and the UN tribunal in
The Hague (Teitel 2005). Victims, and society in general, felt alienated by
international and domestic accountability efforts.
Increasing critique from victim associations and human rights
organizations thus helped launch an alternative process to improve the
relationship between law and society. The idea was that progress does not lie
in more personnel, better strategies, and on-site presence of the judiciary
system, but in the way that those who suffered most during the conflicts are
integrated into projects to cope with the past. The activities of several nonprofit organizations—many of which often started working at the outbreak of
violence in the early 1990s7 or shortly after—demonstrate the increasing
efforts to raise victims’ voices in transitional justice processes in the Balkans.
In fall 2005, three established non-profit organizations in the region, the
Humanitarian Law Center (Serbia), Documenta (Croatia), and the Research
and Documentation Center (Bosnia and Herzegovina),8 discussed the
prospects of an independent regional commission that investigates and
discloses the facts about war crimes and other serious human rights
violations on the territory of the former Yugoslavia.9 A few years later, these
organizations had gained enough momentum and launched the Coalition for
RECOM with over 100 NGOs from the region in Priština, Kosovo (Coalition
for RECOM 2009). Due to the still highly politicized landscape of war-crimerelated issues in the region, the founders of the initiative stressed the
importance of establishing a platform offering victims an opportunity to
express themselves and put a damper on the relativization of any crimes
against humanity by local and national authorities or justification of “crimes
committed against opposing sides in the conflict” (Coalition for RECOM
2010). The initiative comes hence as a response to other transitional justice

7

Cf. for instance the activities of the Humanitarian Law Center in Belgrade, Serbia, that
documents war crimes in the former Yugoslavia and promotes victims rights, based on various
initiatives, at http://www.hlc-rdc.org/stranice/Linkovi-modula/About-us.en.html (accessed 5
December 2009).
8
These various organizations have as their core mission to document and disclose facts about
the human rights violations and war crimes committed during the 1990s to educate society and
create a voice for victims. Various forms of implementing this mission exist. Documenta, for
instance, among other things, engages in commemorative culture, history teaching, and
dealing with the past initiatives, thus emphasizing the interactive dialogue with society. The
Research and Documentation Center, concentrates its work on documenting missing persons,
and has published a comprehensive account of all the war victims in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
The Bosnian book of the dead (2009), as well as an interactive Google map that shows
location, nature of the crime and number of victims. The Humanitarian Law Center, despite its
involvement in commemorative culture, is known for its strong legal activities, providing support
for victims in court and vis-à-vis state institutions.
9
The International Center for Transnational Justice (ICTJ) and other prominent NGOs in the
region also participated in this discussion.
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mechanisms, such as international and domestic courts, which have proven
to be limited in their success to cope with the violent past in the region.10
RECOM aims at creating a space for victims to be heard in society,
fueling sympathy and understanding, particularly from perpetrator groups.
According to its advocates, RECOM is to provide a mechanism that takes into
account the context of the past conflict. With over half a dozen of countries
involved in the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, dealing with past war
crimes issues does not stop at national borders, but goes beyond the
sovereign territory of the current states. Additionally, RECOM coalition
members plan on creating a comprehensive database of victims to end the
perpetual politicization of the number of victims in the region. RECOM also
aspires to help war crimes prosecutors with evidence material, witness
handling and search of the missing. The initiative’s ambitious goals, however,
are tainted by internal disagreements of different coalition members.
Since the official constitutional meeting of the RECOM coalition in
Priština in 2008 the initiative has faced internal politicking and difficulties.
The driving coalition partners of RECOM, such as Documenta and the
Humanitarian Law Center, in particular, have grappled with mobilizing
coalition partners from Bosnia and Herzegovina, after the head of the
Bosnian RDC, for different reasons, refused to give his official support to the
coalition at one of the meetings in winter 2008.11 Void of an essential
member—BiH constitutes a symbolic member country due to its weighty
history during the 1992-1995 conflict—HLC director, Nataša Kandić,
managed to fill the gap created by the loss of the influential RDC by
partnering with the Association of BiH Journalists.12 Yet, the fact that this
organization does not essentially concentrate on war crimes reporting has
affected its legitimacy within the coalition, according to a prominent member
of the initiative.13 Critique has also come from participating organizations that
have deplored the lack of transparency in RECOM’s decision-making process
(B92 2011). Moreover, the uncertain outcome of whether the commission will
be created and the long process in rallying financial and political support—
both of which have been fluctuating and vague—has also led to a RECOM
fatigue with each of the main partner organizations focusing their energy and
resources on domestic and local programs in their respective home
countries.14 In addition to internal obstacles, the initiative’s institutionalization
process has faced difficulties fueled by other political and international actors
in the region.
Although the political and institutional context in the former Yugoslavia
has become more favorable for the RECOM initiative in recent years,
numerous obstacles still impede the creation of a fact-finding body. In the
following I describe the fragile political progress across the region and outline
some of the inherent problems. The first important political wave of change in

10

See reports published by human rights organizations, including Documenta, the
Humanitarian Law Center, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, among others.
11
See interview with Mirsad Tokača, director of the Research and Documentation Center in
June 2011.
12
See interview with Nataša Kandić, director of the Humanitarian Law Center, in May 2011.
13
See interview with official member of Coalition for RECOM in Zagreb in February 2011.
14
See supra note 13. See also programs by Documenta, http://www.documenta.hr or the
Humanitarian Law Center http://www.hlc-rdc.org (accessed 23 November, 2010).
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the former Yugoslavia occurred in the early 2000s. Tudjman’s death in 1999
allowed the conservative nationalist era to end in which the narrative of the
glorious homeland war to defend the young nation didn’t leave any room for
discussion of war crimes and human rights violations. Serbia’s notorious
leader Milošević was booted out of power after his 2000 electoral defeat and
rising protest from the streets after he attempted to unilaterally remain in
power (Ramet 2010, chap. 12 and 13). This tabula rasa with the past,
however, was only the tip of the iceberg of a long process that is still ongoing.
Indeed, current political leaders in both countries, Ivo Josipović the
president of the Republic of Croatia (who began his first term in February
2010), and Boris Tadić the president of the Republic of Serbia (in his second
term, which started in February 2008), have both made important strides to
foster a climate of rapprochement in the region. They represent a new
political generation that has not been personally involved (be it directly or
indirectly) in war crimes or the human rights violations of the 1990s conflicts.15
In 2007, for instance, Tadić released a statement on Croatian national TV on
the eve of Croatia’s 16th independence anniversary, June 24, 2007,
apologizing for crimes committed against the Croatians by members of the
Serbian population.16 While then-president of Croatia, Stjepan Mesić
welcomed the remarks, nationalist hardliners at home, such as Aleksandar
Vučić, secretary general of the Serbian Radical Party, ferociously criticized
him as a national traitor (Popovic 2007). Already in 2004, the Serbian
president has made similar remarks while on a visit to Sarajevo, Bosnia and
Herzegovina.17 More recently, on November 4, 2010, Tadić apologized for the
massacre that took place 19 years ago in Vukovar, a town in Northeastern
Croatia.18 He said that “[b]y acknowledging the crime, by apologizing and
regretting, we are opening the way for forgiveness and reconciliation”; yet not
everyone received him with wide open arms, as several mothers of those
killed in Vukovar turned their backs while he gave his speech (Associated

15

In the 1980s, Josipović was a member of the League of Communists of Croatia, playing a
key role in the democratic transformation of this party as the author of the first statute of the
Social Democratic Party of Croatia (SDP) after Croatia’s independence. He left politics in the
mid-1990s, pursuing his academic career as a law professor at the University of Zagreb and
only reentered the political realm in 2003, when Ivica Račan, then acting Prime Minister, invited
him to join the government. Serbia’s president, Boris Tadić, a trained psychologist, was part of
the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, which was key in overthrowing Milosević in 2000.
Politically part of the Democratic Party, he has made multiple symbolic reconciliatory public
statements that are a sign of collaboration and understanding of both countries.
16
The rising wave of apologies in the region of the former Yugoslavia is not limited to Serbia
and Croatia. In November 2010, Bakir Izetbegovic, Bosniak member of Bosnia-Herzegovina's
tripartite presidency, apologized for deaths caused by his ethnic group among other ethnicities.
This trend started in 2000 with Montenegrin President Milan Djukanovic, when he apologized
for the 1991 shelling of the Croatian coastal city of Dubrovnik in which his country was
involved. Since, the Serbian and Croat heads of state have apologized in 2003, and Tadić
apologized to Bosnians in Sarajevo in 2004 for Serbian atrocities committed there. Additionally,
Josipović has apologized at Jasenovac, a World War II concentration camp, where tens of
thousands of people were killed during World War II. Public apologies are not the only trend, as
there have been political and judicial conciliation as well. The Parliament of Serbia, for
instance, voted on a resolution on the 1995 Srebrenica massacre, while Croatia is assisting
Serbia in its bid to join the EU (Nenad Pejic 2010)
17
See “Tadić se izvinio građanima Hrvatske,” B92, 24 June 2007.
18
Vukovar is situated close to the Serbian border and a war site where Serbian forces took
over 200 hospitalized Croats to a nearby pig farm in Ovčara and massacred them in November
1991.
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Press 2010). Both of these examples illustrate how the political landscape
equals a minefield, as not only right-wing nationalist veterans feel betrayed,
but also victims express their discontent with political symbolism that does not
go far enough in their eyes. Tadić’s Croatian counterpart, Josipović,
reciprocated these symbolic steps, and during the November 4, 2010
ceremony in Vukuvar, he laid down a wreath in commemoration of over a
dozen Serbs that had been killed in a nearby village (Ibid.).19 Both leaders
have also expressed their political backing of the RECOM initiative, in fall
2010 when RECOM members solicited them to publicly ask for their support
(Andrić and Hadžović 2011).
However, in spite of the symbolic gestures and discourses by head of
states in both of these countries (and across the region) institutional
drawbacks remain—ranging from the lack of investigations of war crimes
involving high-profile Croatian politicians, such as the former speaker of the
parliament, Viktor Šeks (Amnesty International 2010), to the appointment by
the current Serbian government of Zoran Stanković as head of the Serbian
Ministry of Health who is a crony of indicted war criminal, Bosnian Serbian
General Ratko Mladić (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2011a).
Interestingly, support from international organizations to create RECOM’s
institutional framework also remains limited and further complicates human
rights efforts to account for war crimes. While the Political Affairs Committee
of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (CoE) has released a
report expressing its support for regional reconciliatory justice mechanisms
among states of the former Yugoslavia, such as the regional truth-seeking
initiative RECOM (Marcenaro 2011), other organizations, including the United
Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the European Union (EU),
among others, avoid public statements that engage in political or financial
support of RECOM.20 Politicking among Coalition members and the lack of
external support, however, are not the only challenges the RECOM initiative
has to overcome. During the creation of this truth space a debate about the
meaning of victims has emerged, producing different opposing narratives of
victimhood.

Multiple Conflicting Narratives of Victimhood
Recent scholarship has grappled with the question of victimhood in postauthoritarian regimes. Drawing on interviews and news sources with the
confessions of perpetrators in post-conflict settings in Argentina, Brazil, Chile
and South Africa, for instance, Leigh Payne analyzes the behavior of
perpetrators (in terms of remorse, heroism, denial, or sadism, or through lies
or betrayal) and the reaction of victim groups (Payne 2008). In the case of the
former Yugoslavia, denial still remains an important phenomenon in society.
Partly, as we will see in the following, because state institutions have
sustained certain political discourses—such as the foundational myth of the
Croatian Homeland War 1991-1995. In this context, veterans have enjoyed
19

In spring 2010, when giving a talk in front of the Bosnian Parliament, Josivpović also
apologized for crimes committed against Bosnians by the Croatian people. See “Josivpović
apologizes for Croatia´s role in war in Bosnia,” Croatian Times, 15 April 2010.
20
See interview with United Nations Development Program and European Union officials in
Sarajevo in May 2011.
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privileges guaranteed and provided by the state.21 On the contrary, state
institutions across the region have often ignored the fate of war victims and
their families. During the RECOM consultation process participating victims
association have therefore stressed the need to define the meaning and
status of a victim, illustrating RECOM initiators’ conundrum of integrating
different narratives of the region’s looming past.
As a member of a local victim association from Zvornik, a town in
northeastern Bosnia from which nearly all Muslims were expelled during the
1992-1995 war, underlined:
Persecution of the civilian population can’t be compared to the persecution of those who
bore rifles and were members of a military formation. Today, these numbers are being
made equal. It is impossible to make a balance in this war: they are trying to make it up
with the previous war. (...) This means that a civilian is a civilian, a soldier should not be
mentioned because after all he was a member of the army, those are separate issues.
However, here we exclusively speak about civilians, people who were taken and killed at
their doorsteps or a bit further depending on where one was killed (Cited in Coalition for
RECOM 2009, 8).

This narrative, however, stands in opposition with the RECOM members’ goal
to establish facts about human rights violations and war crimes of all
victims.22 And indeed, in some cases, the meaning of victim includes social
groups that do not match the Zvornikan’s above definition but include former
members of the armed forces. Although the Coalition for RECOM counts only
six veterans associations versus well over one hundred victim associations,
this situation demonstrates the inherent predicament of RECOM’s leading
members to draw bridges among different local and regional civil society
organizations during their consultation meetings.
In local and regional consultation meetings, such as in Vukovar in
summer 2010 and in Skopje in winter 2010, for instance, members of different
branches of the Association of Underage Volunteers of the Homeland War
also participated in the discussion.23 These organizations have been created
for persons, who at the time of the war were not considered adults, yet fought
in the 1991-1995 Croatian war. As underage participants in the hostilities,
however, the Croatian state does not provide any veteran pensions for these
categories.24 Hence, the concerns of one of their representatives with regards
to RECOM’s task of registering human losses stands in contrast with the
statement given by the member of the Zvornika victims association:
I am in favour of a register of all losses, which would include both civilians and military
men, and that list must inevitably include foreign nationals who participated in those
conflicts. How are we going to register them? We should include them in the same
register, together with the members of international forces. And a separate register
should be created for victims, primarily victims of war crimes.25

21

Veterans in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for instance, have also benefitted from financial and
political support by their respective governments. See (Popić and Panjeta 2010).
22
The final draft of the statute was adopted on the fourth Coalition for RECOM Assembly
Meeting on 26 March 2011 in Belgrade. The draft is available at
http://www.zarekom.org/documents/Proposed-RECOM-Statute.en.html, accessed on 2 May
2011.
23
See reports of the consultation meetings at http://www.zarekom.org/Consultations.en.html,
accessed on 11 February 2011.
24
See informal interview with Documenta director Vesna Teršelić in Vukovar on 14 July 2010.
25
Supra note 23.

7

Arnaud Kurze

RECOM’s policy strategy thus does not necessarily receive the approval from
its main target and support groups of war victims. As a result of its holistic
approach some victims organizations, such as the Mothers of Srebrenica, do
not participate officially as a member of the RECOM coalition because their
members insisted on the exclusive definition of noncombatants (Coalition for
RECOM 2009, 8).26 Narratives by political actors and state institutions also
complicate RECOM’s mission to establish a regional commission.
Nationalist discourses generated by (particularly populist) political actors
across the region still pose an impediment to the successful creation of truth
spaces by human rights activists. As a case in point, after the arrest of Ratko
Mladić on 26 May 2011, the Serbian Radical Party organized a rally
consisting of about 10,000 nationalist protestors who rallied—with a small
amount of participants rioting—in front of the Serbian parliament in Belgrade
to demonstrate against Mladić’s extradition to The Hague (Erlanger 2011).
Earlier, in the spring, Croatia faced a similar fate with nationalists and
veterans mobilizing large part of Croatian society across the region in order to
protest against the ICTY verdict in the General Ante Gotovina case (Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2011b). The verdict was handed down two days
before the initial start date of the RECOM signature in Croatia. Given the very
tense political climate in the country, human rights activists postponed the
launch of the signature campaign to a later date in order to prevent violence
among their campaign volunteers and demonstrators.27 Drawing on the latter
case, I will explore the question of state victimhood, as an institutional hurdle
to the constitution of truth spaces in society—in addition to the differing
narratives of victims mentioned above—and which further exacerbates the
work of NGO activists in the field.
Political symbolism has a very strong effect on the community if it is
grounded in lived experience (Bellamy 2003, 1-6). Not surprisingly, the
foundational myth of former Croatian army member, Gotovina—who has risen
to an emblematic war hero figure in Croatian society, and who has incarnated
the ontological core of the nation’s nascent identity in a fight of good (Croatia)
against evil (Serbia)—has sparked ferocious criticism at the intersection
between international and national politics. Despite the Croatian
government’s international cooperation which led to his arrest and transfer to
the ICTY in December 2005, the normative shift in favor of international
humanitarian law in the endlessly dragging—and politically highly explosive—
extradition issue of Gotovina was incomplete. In fact, during the entire period,
politicians carefully open debate on Croatia’s national foundational myths
(Pavlaković 2008). After the verdict, the Croatian government even took the
necessary steps to initiate an appeals process and provide sufficient legal
and financial assistance to Gotovina’s defense team in The Hague (Croatian
Times 2011).
Moreover, however, comparing judicial institutional practices with the
above discursive practices in politics highlights how identity shifts and
collective memory are more difficult to change. As a case in point, recent war
crimes prosecutions, such as the Medak Pocket case before the Zagreb
County Court in 2008—a trial in which two former Croatian generals were
26
27

Supra note 13.
See interview with Signature Campaign officials of the Coalition for RECOM in May 2011.
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accused of crimes against ethnic Serbian civilians during a military operation
in the fall of 1993 in the south-central region of Croatia—highlight the
judiciary’s reluctance to apply practices in compliance with international
transitional justice norms.28 Human rights organizations monitoring trials have
criticized the prosecution’s lack of interest “in identifying and punishing other
commanders and direct perpetrators in the Medak Pocket case, in spite of
evidence pointing to certain persons, members of certain military formation”
(Kandić 2009, 131). These drawbacks within national judicial institutions are
not exceptions, but a trend in how transitional justice is struggling to move
from the international to the national level (Lazić, Jahić, and Kruhonja 2009,
18-24; Subotić 2009, 101-6; Pavlaković 2009, 17). It is unsurprising then, that
human rights activists have geared up to provide alternative spaces of
deliberation for victims in society. Paradoxically, however, with the aim to
confront the issue of politicization of accountability efforts, their activities are
influenced by and rely on a legalistic perspective, which in turn poses a
number of problems.

The Legalization of Truth Spaces and Challenges
At the beginning of this article I introduced a trend I refer to as the legalization
of truth spaces—basically describing the phenomenon how activists,
practitioners, representatives and experts employ tangible and practicable
legal instruments during consultation meetings in order to establish the
mandate for the regional commission. In the following section I will discuss
the phenomenon, because this juridification of truth-seeking bodies bears its
roots in a broader law-society development. It describes the interactions
between legal experts—i.e. elite, academic and professional networks—and
their relationship to society in diverse sociopolitical contexts. Though not
applied on the legalization of mechanisms that deal with past mass atrocities,
Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth have studied this trend in a more general
international and regional context. Drawing on Latin America, they have
explored the export of globalized legal knowledge by Western elites and their
relationship to local elites educated in the West in order to scrutinize the
emergence of specific rule of law trends in this region (2002). The conceptual
underpinning of their study can also be applied to the current analysis of the
RECOM fact-seeking initiative.
Indeed, the institutionalization of truth-seeking bodies raises questions
about the influence of hard justice, such as retributive mechanisms, on soft
justice, such as restorative tools, including truth commissions. The former is
based on measurable results, notably the number of processed cases and
rendered verdicts, whereas the latter, at least initially, have relied on
outcomes which seem, at first, less quantifiable. Yet, sociologist and director
of the Truth-Seeking Program at the International Center for Transitional
Justice, Eduardo Gonzalez—who has consulted and participated in many
different local, national and regional initiatives around the world to set up
commissions and bodies that deal with the past29 —has stressed the need to
28

In an unpublished manuscript, “Croatia: Parody of Justice, Case Đermanović,” (2010), Mia
Psorn highlights the problematic rule of law situation in Croatian county courts.
29
He also consulted the RECOM members during meetings in Serbia and Kosovo in spring
and summer 2010.
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think differently when it comes to implementing successful strategies for truth
commissions.30
The reason why judicial mechanisms are able to produce a quicker, and
often, in terms of output (i.e. number of verdicts), more successful track
record, is because law, i.e. the rules generally accepted by a community and
that regulates the actions of its members and in case of a breach may be
enforced by the imposition of penalties, has turned the notion of justice into
something tangible and applicable despite its disputable value and impact on
a subject, in time and in space. The notion of truth, however, cannot easily be
quantifiable or be constrained in a body of legal texts.31 Nonetheless, RECOM
coalition members have set out the goal of creating a large database, tracking
cases and human losses across the region.32 This project thus adopts policy
strategies implemented by the UN ad hoc court—which has a large electronic
database of its cases—and local institutions, such as the Bosnian state court,
which has one of the most state of the art databases to document its cases
and help coordination between different judiciaries on the entity level in BiH.33
Despite the meticulous and ongoing attempts to fit the mandate of a
regional commission neatly into a legal document, the statute, the strengths
of this initiative might lie elsewhere. Various efforts—e.g. numerous
congressional bodies of inquiry on specific massacres or death squads—
have for instance preceded the Peruvian truth commission, which was put in
place in the early 2000s and delivered an 8000-page report at the end of
2003. In fact, the institutionalization of RECOM—no matter how desirable by
its proponents—is far from being a fait accompli. Many factors, ranging from
the regional political climate to internal consensus of the coalition members
demonstrate that this initiative still requires ample support from within and
outside. Notwithstanding, according to a member of the RECOM draft statute
advisory board, even if all these efforts would not result in the creation of the
commission, many positive side effects will remain in the region. The legacy
includes strengthening local grass roots efforts, improving a commemorative
culture, and inciting transnational cooperation between governments and civil
society, among others.34
The efforts put into setting up RECOM, however, are a proof that
stakeholders (including activists, practitioners and lawmakers), are learning
from past mistakes—such as merely copying a fact-finding body that is
modeled on the concept of the South African truth commission—as every
context, conditions and objectives are unique for each case. Hence, to cope
with the dominant influence of legal experts in shaping an adequate body for
dealing with mass atrocities in the Balkans, RECOM members have tried to
expand the range of consultants and experts that the future commission will
draw from. Similar to the Peruvian truth commission—which had political
30

See interview with Eduardo Gonzalez on 10 September 2010 in Belgrade, Serbia.
Retributive justice mechanisms, however, have also a truth-disclosing component and
therefore are considered by some as history-setting institutions. For a discussion on the
history-defining capacity of the ICTY cf. (Wilson 2005).
32
See interview with RECOM coalition members in June 2011.
33
See interview with Sven Marius Urke, secondee of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry and
currently international advisor at the Bosnian High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council in May
2011.
34
See interview with Vjeran Pavlaković, historian (University of Rijeka) and member of
RECOM for overview of human rights activism in Croatia. September 2010.
31
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scientists, anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists and historians, among
others—the Coalition for RECOM has invited scholars, practitioners and
experts from different fields that range from history to psychology.35 While the
ratio of non-legal experts remains still relatively low, this trend highlights the
attempt to tackle political and institutional challenges differently. Each of the
experts brings a unique set of assets and knowledge to the discussion table,
which—notably for the preparation and consultation to define the mandate of
the commission—was very crucial. While psychoanalysts will be able to
evaluate or address questions related to victims and how they deal with
trauma in certain forms of testimonies or public hearings, forensic
anthropologists can help define practical parameters when it comes to
determining the role of RECOM in mass grave discoveries, and historians
prove useful to delineate the historical period for which the commission
should be designed for. Although it is too early to assess the impact of one
choice over another, these developments emphasize the increasing role of
civil society in a dynamic and experimental transitional justice space in the
former Yugoslavia. This experience can also serve as a very helpful example
in the context of other regional post-conflict settings.
Moreover, the section of RECOM’s draft mandate that addresses the
issue of national war crimes prosecutions calls for a brief reflection on
critically embedding truth seeking in a legal and/or judicial space. According
to the draft statute, institutionally, RECOM will be an official body endorsed by
the various governments of the former states of Yugoslavia, but will function
independently. In order to emphasize the institutionalized grassroots effort, a
signature campaign was launched to collect over one million signatures
across the region. The idea was to generate enough public support and
buttress lobbying efforts with respect to introducing legislation in each of the
RECOM member countries to establish the official institutional structure.36 It
will only be in place for a relatively short period of time (two years with a six
months preparation period) with its mandate expanding to the territory of the
states where crimes have been committed in the past. In theory, the body has
a non-judicial character, however, the consequences of certain powers
exerted by the members was a touchy bone of contention in numerous
consultation and workshop meetings between coalition members who
discussed the mandate and role of the commission in view of finalizing the
draft statute.37 This issue illustrates the problematic character of truth
commission mandates in general. On the one hand, their objective is to
disclose facts about human rights violations by providing victims a space to
raise their voice—a form of soft justice to deal with the past. On the other
hand, their goal is also to account for violence and war crimes, which, in
many cases, require some form of retributive justice.38 In the case of the
RECOM statute, article 49, ‘The role of the Commission in criminal

35

Supra note 34, and informal conversations with Vesna Teršelić in August 2010.
Supra note 13. Currently, the campaign collected over 500,000 signatures and now
continues to collect signatures online.
37
Supra note 22.
38
While Rwandan Gacaca courts have dealt with mass atrocities on a local scale (including
shaming and other forms of sanctions for less grave crimes), the Peruvian truth commission
cooperated with the domestic judiciary to prosecute perpetrators.
36
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prosecution,’ has repeatedly been discussed in multiple consultation
sessions.39
Article 49 of the RECOM draft statute comprises three articles relative to
the role of RECOM with respect to alleged perpetrators that participate in,
e.g. public hearings and reveal “information leading to the discovery of a
mass grave location or information significant for discovering other
perpetrators.” While paragraph one stipulates a suggestive power to RECOM
vis-à-vis a war crimes court to recommend mitigating circumstances if any
information is obtained from an alleged perpetrator that could lead to either
the discovery of missing persons in mass graves or other perpetrators,
paragraphs two and three propose pardons if the collected information from
an alleged (paragraph two) or sentenced (paragraph three) perpetrator lead
to further discoveries that help the overall fact-finding mission about past
atrocities. Prima facie, this discussion seems purely legal, concerning the
definition of the roles between the judiciary and RECOM. This issue,
however, when examined more closely, reveals a set of problems that range
from defining the scope of amnesties–which in the case of RECOM have a
conditional character—to the current judicial system’s effectiveness in the
region, thus turning the scope of legal issues into political challenges.40
Conclusion
This article has examined the recent regional restorative justice mechanisms
in the former Yugoslavia, the so called Coalition for RECOM, which is
currently taking shape and finished its consultations process and meetings to
define its mandate and the institutional character of its body. After the violent
disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the region has witnessed several
retributive and restorative mechanisms to cope with the past, including war
crimes tribunals—on the international and (to a lesser, but still noticeable
extent) national level—and truth-seeking and fact-finding initiatives. During
these processes human rights activists have occupied an important
intermediary function, communicating and interacting between spaces
constituted of varying justice and truth narratives. The aim of this article was
to analyze these different, intersecting spaces and the role of civil society
within these spaces to help understand recent practices to establish a
transnational truth-seeking mechanism. In the beginning, the study addressed
the ongoing internal and external struggle of human rights activists to
establish an extra-legal space to deal with the past across the former
Yugoslavia. In this context, I also analyzed the conflicting impact of different
victim groups’ narratives that accompanied the institutionalization process.
Finally, I examined the consequences of legal concepts that influence the
institutionalization of truth-seeking measures—a trend, which I refer to as the
legalization of truth spaces. Activists thus managed to increase their
‘invented’ space to foster deliberative spaces of justice for civil society.
39

The following information is based on the statute from 26 March 2011. Supra note 22.
Several case studies discuss the legal problems of amnesties, elaborating on the political
difficulties of amnesties to foster democratic transition and arguing that that amnesties or
pardons should only be considered in exceptional cases as to not jeopardize the retributive
justice efforts and only if other forms of justice mechanisms, such as restorative instruments,
are in place (Stahn 2005; Gibson 2002).
40
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Paradoxically, however, I also demonstrated that despite their goal of legaloriented depoliticization of restorative justice processes, transitional justice
efforts in the region remain nonetheless highly political. The road to a
sustainable transition in the region is still long and will require human rights
activists to continue their grass-roots projects and establish a dialogue
between different victim groups across the former Yugoslavia. Yet, at the
same time, they also need to invest in their technical expertise in order to
secure additional external funding to maintain and expand their restorative
justice efforts.
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